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Unconstitutional or Just Unworkable? 
The Life and Death of a Prohibition on 
Floor-Crossing in Fletcher v the 
Government of Manitoba 
 
A N D R E W  F L A V E L L E  M A R T I N *  
ABSTRACT 
Fletcher v the Government of Manitoba is the first reported challenge to a floor-
crossing prohibition under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This 
case comment begins with the legislative history of the challenged provision 
and then provides an overview and critique of the reasons in Fletcher. 
Against this backdrop, it then reflects on the lessons of the case in two 
respects. The first is the difficulty in translating a policy idea into legislation 
– specifically, defining the conduct to be prohibited and determining the 
appropriate deterrent or penalty for breach. The second respect is the 
government’s role in defending legislation in court, particularly legislation 
that it considers to be bad policy and plans to repeal. The comment 
concludes that Fletcher ultimately demonstrates that governments should 
defend constitutionally viable laws in court – even laws that were adopted 
by a previous government and that are destined for repeal as bad policy. 
 
Keywords: Manitoba; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; Floor-
crossing; Party switching; Legislation; Lawmaking; Attorney General 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most controversial things a legislator can do is cross the 
floor, i.e. join the caucus of a party other than that under which he or she 
was elected.1 Fletcher v the Government of Manitoba2 is the first reported 
challenge to such a prohibition under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.3 Fletcher presents an excellent opportunity to reflect on larger 
themes in lawmaking and the government’s legal defence of legislation. 
Steven Fletcher, the member of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba for 
the riding of Assiniboia, was expelled from the governing Conservative 
caucus.4 He was then bound by a floor-crossing prohibition in the Legislative 
Assembly Act that prevented him from joining another party’s caucus.5 He 
applied for a declaration that the prohibition breached the Charter, 
specifically sections 2(b) (expression), 2(d) (assembly), and 3 (democratic 
rights). While the application was unsuccessful, the government 
simultaneously passed a bill repealing the prohibition.6 The bill received 
Royal Assent fifteen days before Fletcher’s application was denied.7 
This comment analyzes the reasons in Fletcher and their larger 
implications, and is organized in four parts. In Part I, I establish the context 
for my commentary: the language and legislative history of the prohibition 
and the legislative history of its repeal. In Part II, I canvas and critique the 
Court’s decision in Fletcher. In Part III, I consider the lessons for lawmaking, 
and in Part IV I consider the implications for the government’s legal defence 
                                                     
1  For a recent and fairly standard account of floor-crossing, see e.g. “Leona Alleslev and 
the unseemly politics of crossing the floor”, The Globe and Mail (19 September 2018) 
online: <theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globe-editorial-leona-alleslev-
and-the-unseemly-politics-of-crossing/> [perma.cc/NKW9-B5RS] [Globe editorial].  
2  Fletcher v the Government of Manitoba, 2018 MBQB 104 [Fletcher].  
3  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 2(b), 3, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
4  Fletcher, supra note 2 at paras 1-2. 
5  Ibid at para 3; The Legislative Assembly Act, CCSM c L110, s 52.3.1.  
6  The Legislative Assembly Amendment Act (Member Changing Parties), SM 2018, c 3; 
Manitoba, Bill 4, 34th Leg, 3rd Sess (2018) [Member Changing Parties Act].  
7  Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 41-3, vol LXXI No 58 (4 
June 2018) at 2846 [Hansard (4 June 2018)]. 
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of legislation. I then conclude by reflecting on these lessons and their 
implications. 
II.  PART I – CONTEXT: THE PROHIBITION’S ADOPTION AND 
REPEAL 
Prior to its repeal, section 52.3.1 of The Legislative Assembly Act read as 
follows: 
A member who: 
a) is elected with the endorsement of a political party; and 
b) ceases to belong to the caucus of that party during the term for which 
he or she was elected; 
must sit in the Assembly as an independent and is to be treated as such for the 
purposes of this Act and all proceedings in the Assembly during the remainder 
of the member's term.8 
Other than fixing a minor typographical error,9 the section was never 
amended. 
When section 52.3.1 was adopted in 2006, then-Premier Gary Doer of 
the NDP framed the issue as one of voter trust: “We believe the voters trust, 
if you run as a Tory, even if you do not agree with their policies, you have 
to stay with the Tories or be an independent. You cannot cross the floor to 
another political party.”10 The Liberal party argued that recall legislation 
would be a more comprehensive and direct way to ensure voter trust than 
an outright ban on floor-crossing, allowing voters to judge legislators and 
their reasons for doing so.11 The Conservative party argued instead for a 
prohibition on “inducements,” such as cabinet membership, to cross the 
                                                     
8  The Legislative Assembly Act, supra note 5, s 52.3.1, as added by The Elections Reform Act, 
SM 2006, c 15, Sched E, s 1. 
9  The Statutes Correction and Minor Amendments Act, 2010, SM 2010, c 33, s 31(4): 
“Clause 52.3.1(b) of the English version is amended by striking out "her" and 
substituting "he".” 
10  Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 38-4, vol LVII No 66 (10 May 
2006) [Hansard (10 May 2006)] at 1985 (Hon Gary Doer). For my purposes, Doer’s 
expressed belief is more important than its accuracy. See below note 52 and 
accompanying text. 
11  Ibid at 1992 (Hon Jon Gerrard); Ibid at 1987 (Kevin Lamoreux). 
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floor.12 Opposition members further noted that some legislators cross the 
floor for principled reasons by stating: “If somebody wants to cross the floor 
on a matter of principle, that is important. We think they should have the 
right to do that.”13 As well, they noted that Winston Churchill did so 
twice.14 
In the shadow of Fletcher’s court application, the Conservative 
government introduced a bill to repeal the prohibition. The Minister of 
Justice gave two main reasons for the repeal. One was that the prohibition 
was “unparliamentary” and “goes against…the Westminster parliamentary 
traditions that we uphold in our country.”15 The second reason was to avoid 
spending money defending against Fletcher’s application in court – “saving 
taxpayers thousands in potential legal expenses defending the floor-crossing 
ban.”16 The Minister also made two revealing comments that I will return 
to below – that the prohibition was “an… unworkable policy” and that it 
“should never have been introduced in the first place.”17 While the Minister 
refused to state whether or not the prohibition was constitutional, Fletcher 
referred to previous government statements that it was unconstitutional, 
and suggested a faster way to avoid the costs of defending against his 
application would be to concede it.18 In contrast, NDP legislator and former 
Minister of Justice Andrew Swan suggested that the government had 
received advice that the prohibition was arguably constitutional, and that 
                                                     
12  Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 38-4, vol LVII No 79B (30 
May 2006) at 2787 (Hugh McFadyen). 
13  Ibid.  
14  Hansard (10 May 2006) supra note 10 at 1992 (Hon Jon Gerrard). 
15  Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 41-3, vol LXXI No 8B (30 
November 2017) at 263, 264 (Hon Heather Stefanson) [Hansard (30 November 
2017)].  
16  Ibid at 263. See also 264, 265. 
17  Ibid at 263. 
18  Ibid at 266 (Steven Fletcher). See also 264, 265. Fletcher at 264 also quite reasonably 
suggested, in the alternative to conceding the application, that the Minister of Justice 
seek unanimous consent to fast-track the bill. 
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was why the government could not concede the application.19 He also 
argued that the prohibition remained necessary for voter trust.20  
In this comment, I use the term “bad policy” to reflect the government’s 
public position that the floor-crossing prohibition was unparliamentary and 
unworkable and never should have been adopted. I emphasize that “bad 
policy” is about laws that pose problems other than unconstitutionality.21 
III. PART II – THE COURT’S DECISION AND MY CRITIQUE 
In this Part, I canvass the arguments made by the parties and the reasons 
given by the Court for denying the application. I then offer a critique of 
those reasons. 
A. The Positions of the Parties 
Fletcher argued that the prohibition infringed his Charter rights and 
“has the practical effect of limiting [his] ability to represent his 
constituents.”22 According to his argument, his freedom of association 
under section 2(d) was infringed because the prohibition prevented him 
from associating with a recognized political party, which would provide him 
advantages in the legislature that were not available to independent 
members,23 thus “preventing [him] from fully exercising [his] freedom of 
                                                     
19  Ibid at 278 (Andrew Swan): “He’s [Fletcher’s] asked a number of times, well, why don’t 
they just throw in the towel? Well, the reason they can’t throw in the towel is because 
they’ve got advice, I know, from their own department saying, well, actually, we think 
there is a very arguable case that this legislation continues to be constitutional. That’s 
the problem that this minister has.” 
20  Ibid at 274. 
21  Indeed, this is consistent with the language of the application judge. See Fletcher, supra 
note 2 at paras 47, 60, 82 (“bad public policy”). 
22  Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 13. 
23  Ibid at para 26: “a) the ability to caucus; b) the right to have a House Leader to 
participate in procedural discussions with the House leader of the Government and 
the Official Opposition; c) the right to participate in the Legislative Assembly by 
asking questions to the full extent contemplated by the Rules; d) the right to sit and 
vote on Committees of the Legislative Assembly; e) the right to an allocation of 
resources of the Legislative Assembly; f) the right to fund raise and to issue tax receipts 
to donors; g) the right to one of the opposition days established by the Rules of the 
Legislative Assembly; h) the right to select up to three private members' bills as a 
 
56   MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL | VOLUME 42 | ISSUE 1 
 
association by pursuing [his] goals/objectives as an MLA.”24 His freedom of 
expression under section 2(b) was infringed because the prohibition 
prevented him “from joining any other political party to caucus,”25 and 
because of the same limitations on his activities as an independent MLA as 
noted above.26 Fletcher also argued that section 3 was infringed because 
“[b]y denying his right to join another political party, [his] constituents have 
lost the ability to understand their member’s views on the issues of the 
day.”27 Fletcher further argued that none of these infringements were 
justifiable under section 1 of the Charter because the objective of 
“preventing members from changing political parties during the course of 
the term in which they were elected cannot be considered pressing and 
substantial,”28 the impairment was not minimal, and the harms exceeded 
the benefits.29 
In response, the government argued that the prohibition was protected 
from judicial review as “part of the inherent parliamentary privilege to 
control its internal proceedings,”30 and in any event did not violate the 
Charter:  
[N]otwithstanding s. 52.3.1, the applicant is free to associate with whomever he 
pleases. He is not restricted from joining or caucusing with any political party he 
chooses. There are no limitations on the topics where he can offer an opinion. He 
can campaign and raise money for himself or any political party. As with all MLAs, 
he is bound by the internal procedural rules and practices of the legislature, which 
                                                     
member of an opposition caucus to come to a second reading vote each session.” See 
also Cameron Siles, “Modest Steps Toward Reform: A Review of Post-Emerson 
Initiatives to Curtail Floor Crossing” (2012) 30:2 NJCL 171 at 179: “If an MLA 
wishes to sit as an independent, they can do so without triggering a by-election, but at 
the cost of doing without the rights and privileges (primarily additional staff and 
research resources) that come with being a member of a recognized party caucus.” 
24  Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 27. 
25  Ibid at para 31. 
26  Ibid at paras 32-33. 
27  Ibid at para 38. 
28  Ibid at para 40. 
29  Ibid at paras 39-44. 
30  Ibid at para 48. 
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are part of the Assembly's inherent parliamentary privilege to control its internal 
proceedings, and does not violate his Charter rights in the ways suggested.31 
At the same time, the government “conceded that s. 52.3.1 of the Act runs 
counter to the parliamentary tradition in Canada.”32 
B. The Reasons 
Justice Lanchbery held that the prohibition was protected by 
parliamentary privilege and that it did not infringe sections 2(b), 2(d), or 3 
of the Charter.33 Section 3 was not infringed because the prohibition “has 
no effect on the right to vote, or to be an MLA.”34 The alleged infringement 
of expression was not supported by the evidence, as Fletcher “remains able 
to attempt to persuade others … to come to his point of view whether inside 
or outside the legislature.... his speech has not been subject to any 
restrictions as he has claimed.”35 Indeed, as an independent member 
Fletcher actually had greater ability to express himself.36 Neither was his 
freedom of association infringed: 
The applicant is incorrect that he is prohibited from joining any political party that 
permits him to be a member. Section 52.3.1 does not limit this ability in any way. 
The applicant can caucus with any political party or group of members of the 
legislature that permits him to caucus. Caucusing is the ability to join discussions 
with others with their permission. It does not mean that you have to be a member 
of that party. I take judicial notice that in fact independent members in the 
legislature and in the House of Commons are able to caucus with members of a 
different political party without restrictions placed upon that activity by the 
                                                     
31  Ibid at para 49. 
32  Ibid at para 47. 
33  Ibid at paras 82 (privilege), 69 (Charter). 
34  Ibid at para 68. I note here Siles’ argument that the floor-crossing prohibition 
promotes the section 3 rights of voters, because floor-crossing “cast[s] doubt about 
whether their choice was a fully informed one based on accurate and complete 
information provided to them by candidates”: Siles, supra note 23 at 182-183. See also 
Karen Eltis, “Proportionally Reconciling Floor-Crossing With Conflicting Charter 
Rights: A Proposal for Regulating the Practice” (2008) 22:2 NJCL 215 esp at 219-223, 
230-233. Eltis also argues that floor-crossing is contrary to voters’ freedom of 
expression in choosing the party for which to vote at 221, 233-235. 
35  Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 74. 
36  Ibid at paras 71-79. 
 
58   MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL | VOLUME 42 | ISSUE 1 
 
legislature or Parliament. The only restrictions on his ability to do so is having 
other members agreeing to caucus with him.37 
Furthermore, parliamentary privilege applied because “[t]here is nothing to 
suggest that s. 52.3.1 does anything but provide for the dignity, integrity and 
efficient functioning of the legislature.”38 
In reaching his decision, Lanchbery J also made important observations 
about the role of the court in these circumstances. First, the government’s 
repeal of the prohibition did not affect the question of its legality or the 
court’s responsibility to decide the matter before it: 
In a Charter argument that involves a question of parliamentary privilege, it must 
be remembered that if one political party is of the view that the legislation is bad 
public policy, it does not and should not end the matter. Revocation does not 
mean that a different political party or even a future government of the same 
political stripe may seek to reintroduce similar legislation.39 
Second, the fact that a provision “may be bad public policy” is not an 
appropriate reason for courts to interfere, especially as the provision relates 
to the legislature.40 
While not essential to his decision, Lanchbery J also made some 
important comments about floor-crossing generally. Near the beginning of 
his reasons, Lanchbery J discussed what floor-crossing means and why it is 
considered to be objectionable: 
The record is clear that the legislation was designed to prevent "floor crossing". 
Floor crossing is commonly understood to mean when a member leaves the 
benches of the political party to whom he/she was elected to serve, and seeks to 
join the ranks of another political party, without facing the electorate. The most 
publicized instances, and therefore the most recognizable by members of the 
general public, are those where the member is … offered an inducement such as a 
seat in the Cabinet of the governing party. 
 
Public sentiment about floor crossing has generally been negative …. The theory 
behind the ban against floor crossing and joining another political party is that if 
                                                     
37  Ibid at para 76. 
38  Ibid at para 80. I note here Siles’ argument that floor-crossing is political and so not 
justiciable: Siles, supra note 23 at 185. However, I would argue that parliamentary 
privilege (which Siles also considers at 185-186, without naming it explicitly) is a 
better and more Canadian fit than political non-justiciability. 
39  Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 60. 
40  Ibid at para 82. 
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a member wishes to leave his/her political party, it is the voter that should decide 
the fate of such a member before he/she is allowed to cross the floor, and not the 
unilateral wishes of the member, or another political party.41 
Justice Lanchbery also noted that Fletcher’s circumstances were different 
than the typical floor-crossing scenario but the prohibition as written did 
not recognize that difference:  
In this case, the applicant did not cross the floor, but was expelled from the 
Progressive Conservative caucus. This is a distinction without a difference for the 
purpose of the Act. The applicant must face the voters if he wants to be recognized 
as a member of another party in the legislature.42 
Later in his reasons, Lanchbery J returned to this point, again distinguishing 
Fletcher’s circumstances from what he termed “traditional floor crossing”: 
It is clear that the applicant follows his own conscience. He has always displayed a 
sense of independence, which is at times at odds with party discipline. Should such 
a member be penalized by s. 52.3.1 when his actions were not the traditional "floor 
crossing"? Section 52.3.1 is a blanket provision that does not distinguish between 
the different types of floor crossing.43 
These observations raise important questions about the appropriate scope 
and design of a prohibition on floor-crossing. 
C. Critique of the Reasons 
There are two respects in which the reasons are curious: mootness, and 
the scope and meaning of freedom of association. There is also an 
overlooked question about the constitutional nature and role of 
parliamentary tradition and the part it ought to play in circumstances such 
as these. 
The first and most obvious curiosity in the reasons is that there is no 
explicit discussion of mootness. As mentioned above, the decision came 
down fifteen days after the repeal received royal assent.44 While there were 
nonetheless good reasons to continue – in particular, judicial economy and, 
as Lanchbery J noted, the possibility that the prohibition could be re-
                                                     
41  Ibid at paras 5-6 [emphasis in original]. As for the generalization that “[p]ublic 
sentiment about floor crossing has generally been negative”, see below note 52 and 
accompanying text.  
42  Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 7. 
43  Ibid at para 63. 
44  Hansard (4 June 2018), supra note 7. 
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enacted in future – it seems surprising that the issue was not addressed 
explicitly. 
The second curiosity in the reasons is that the reasons given set out a 
fairly narrow or thin conception of freedom of association. Recall that 
Lanchbery J adopted a thin conception of caucusing:  
The applicant can caucus with any political party or group of members of the 
legislature that permits him to caucus. Caucusing is the ability to join discussions 
with others with their permission. It does not mean that you have to be a member 
of that party.45 
Under this conception, Fletcher’s freedom of association is purportedly 
maintained because he is able to associate with other members, even though 
he is not able to be recognized and to identify himself to others as a member 
of a party’s caucus. This seems to be a surprisingly minimalist conception of 
freedom of political association. Indeed, one can reasonably presume that 
caucusing with legislators of a different party is rare in modern Canadian 
politics, given the dominance and centrality of political parties and the 
consequences of perceived disloyalty.46 Moreover, it is the formal party and 
caucus membership, not mere caucusing itself in the sense invoked by 
Lanchbery J, that is meaningful and provides advantages. 
The reasons in Fletcher also leave a key question about parliamentary 
privilege unanswered. The recognition of parliamentary privilege in the 
written constitution comes from the preamble to the Constitution Act, 
1867.47 However, the preamble arguably recognizes and incorporates 
                                                     
45  Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 76. See above note 34 and accompanying text.  
46  See e.g. Semara Sevi, Antoine Yoshinaka & Andrew Blais, “Legislative Party Switching 
and the Changing Nature of the Canadian Party System, 1867-2015” (2018) 51:3 Can 
J Political Science 665 at 665: “Organized less around connecting citizens to 
government and more around getting politicians elected, contemporary parties are 
professionalized campaign machines tuned to complex information environments. To 
a greater extent than before, party officials fundraise, develop brand images, conduct 
market research, advertise, and, if successful, manage the affairs of government. 
Parties are therefore seen as “in service” to the elected officials whose careers depend 
on receiving party support” [citations omitted]. See also 666: “Those who do not toe 
the party line do so to the detriment of their political careers…. Parties discipline 
disloyal MPs and isolate them from their colleagues” [citation omitted]. Presumably 
caucusing with a non-party legislator would be seen as disloyalty. 
47  Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, 
No 5. See e.g. Canada (House of Commons) v Vaid, 2005 SCC 30 at para 29: 
“Parliamentary privilege does not create a gap in the general public law of Canada but 
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Westminster parliamentary tradition as part of the Constitution. Insofar as 
floor-crossing was allowed under that tradition,48 the preamble itself 
arguably provides duelling answers. Does it protect a prohibition on floor-
crossing because that prohibition is part of parliamentary privilege for the 
legislature to determine its own internal governance and processes? This is 
the answer given in Fletcher. But it could also be the case that the preamble 
prevents a prohibition on floor-crossing, because that prohibition is 
contrary to Westminster parliamentary tradition.49 In other words, does 
parliamentary privilege allow the legislature to contravene parliamentary 
tradition? There is a compelling argument to be made that, insofar as floor-
crossing was a recognized part of Parliamentary practice in the United 
Kingdom and thus an aspect of the unwritten Canadian constitution, the 
prohibition in Fletcher was actually contrary to the preamble instead of 
protected by it. This argument remains unraised and unanswered. However, 
it does suggest that the government’s concession that the prohibition was 
contrary to parliamentary tradition was not as innocuous as it seemed and 
was perhaps unwise. 
                                                     
is an important part of it, inherited from the Parliament at Westminster by virtue of 
the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867” [citations omitted] [Constitution Act UK]. 
48  See e.g. Robert Leach, Turncoats: Changing Party Allegiance by British Politicians 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995) at 3, who traces UK floor-crossing back as far as 1886. 
For a list of floor-crossing from 1900 to 2015 in the UK Parliament, see Roger 
Mortimore & Andrew Blick, eds, Butler’s British Political Facts (London: Palgrave 
McMillan, 2018) at 388-395. In the Canadian context, see e.g. Gregory Tardi, 
“Change of Political Allegiance in Parliamentary Life” (2007) 33:3 Commonwealth L 
Bulletin 429 at 430, who traces floor crossing in post-confederation Canada back to 
1868. 
49  See e.g. Tardi, supra note 48 at 433-434: “A reasonable argument can be made that 
once a member has been elected to the House of Commons, their most significant 
parliamentary privilege is their ability to speak in favour of, to vote with, and 
therefore, to ally themselves with, the political formation of their choice. This 
privilege applies throughout the MP’s time in Parliament, and includes their ability to 
change the direction of their speech, their vote and their allegiance at any time. 
Considering the constitutional nature and character of Parliamentary privilege, this 
ability on the part of MPs is thus opposable to any duty or obligation that may be 
born out of simple statute or claimed to have arisen from the common law. The 
lineage of this line of argumentation is based on Canada’s inheritance of 
parliamentary privilege from the United Kingdom” [emphasis added]. 
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IV. PART III – LESSONS: FROM IDEA TO LEGISLATION 
Aside from the merits of the reasons themselves, the decision in Fletcher 
and the prohibition itself offer compelling case studies in two respects: the 
process of translating an idea into legislation, and the proper role of the 
Attorney General in defending legislation that the government intends to 
repeal. In this Part, I consider the former. 
The prohibition itself and the decision in Fletcher form a compelling 
case study in the difficulty of translating an idea into legislation. First, how 
do we define floor-crossing? Justice Lanchbery provided a definition that 
seems appropriate: “Floor crossing is commonly understood to mean when 
a member leaves the benches of the political party to whom he/she was 
elected to serve, and seeks to join the ranks of another political party, 
without facing the electorate.”50 He also noted that the most objectionable 
kind of floor-crossing is “where the member is […] offered an inducement 
such as a seat in the Cabinet of the governing party.”51  
Next, why is floor-crossing objectionable enough that a prohibition is 
appropriate – to those who do consider it objectionable? I acknowledge here 
that voter opposition to floor-crossing may be “conventional wisdom” more 
than empirical fact.52 However, that is the wisdom that appeared to animate 
the comments of Lanchbery J and the Manitoba legislators during both the 
adoption and the repeal of the floor-crossing prohibition. Floor-crossing is 
objectionable because voters incorporate party affiliation into their voting 
choices, running as a party’s candidate implies a commitment to that party 
                                                     
50  Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 5; see above note 41 and accompanying text. 
51  Ibid; see above note 41 and accompanying text. 
52  Feodor Snagovsky & Matthew Kerby, “The Electoral Consequences of Party Switching 
in Canada: 1945-2011” (2018) 51:2 Can J Political Science 425 at 426: “conventional 
wisdom portrays [party] switching as an act of political self-immolation: few MPs who 
switch parties get re-elected.” See also Sevi, Yoshinaka & Blais, supra note 46 at 666: 
“Floor crossing in the contemporary era is the ultimate risky proposition.” Snagovsky 
& Kerby provide a thoughtful quantitative analysis of whether MPs who switch parties 
receive more or fewer votes in the subsequent election. While “the proportion of MPs 
who switch parties and fail in their bids for re-election is considerably higher than it is 
for those [who] do not switch at all” (431), the impact and degree of impact varies 
depending on the reasons for, and circumstances surrounding, the switch: 441-442. 
For a longer-term historical analysis, see Sevi, Yoshinaka & Blais, supra note 46 at 685-
692. 
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(at least for the term of office), and a change in party is a substantial change 
on which voters should be able to reconsider their voting choices. Or, as 
Heather MacIvor puts it, “the act of campaigning under a particular political 
banner creates a principled and political link between the MP so elected, 
the party and the constituents, which the law ought not allow to be 
breached.”53 Similarly, Cameron Siles describes the act of floor crossing as 
invoking, “[t]he sense that voters had somehow been ‘duped’… and deprived 
of their right to be fully-informed and participate meaningfully in the 
electoral process.”54 Consider also Karen Eltis’ articulation of a prevalent 
view that “a vote for one’s member of Parliament is tantamount to a vote 
for a particular party, its program and its leader.”55 Thus a prohibition may 
be an appropriate legislative response. 
However, the Manitoban prohibition might be overinclusive, i.e. there 
are some situations that may be captured by this prohibition that might be 
different and permissible. As noted by Lanchbery J, Fletcher’s situation was 
that he was expelled from his party’s caucus. Is that different enough that 
he should be able to join another party? During the debates on the repeal 
of the prohibition, one NDP legislator suggested not, saying that “when 
folks are kicked out of their caucus, they have to deal with the 
                                                     
53  Heather MacIvor, “Federal Bill C-208 of 2006 and 2007: A Legislative Proposal on 
Floor Crossing” (2009) 2 JPPL 329 at 329. See also Lori Turnbull, “Rules are Not 
Enough: How Can We Enforce Ethical Principles?” (2008) 1 JPPL 351 at 357: “[floor-
crossing] is now interpreted widely as an MP’s betrayal of his constituents’ preferences 
and an abuse of their trust.” 
54  Siles, supra note 23 at 172. 
55  Eltis, supra note 34 at 222. See also Sevi, Yoshinaka & Blais, supra note 46 at 667: 
“Canada’s electoral system went from a candidate-centred system to a party-centred 
one, where the party leader and the label play a huge role in deciding the fortune of 
the individual candidate.” See similarly Globe editorial, supra note 1: “After all, many 
if not most MPs are elected because of the banner they carry”. But see for example the 
work of Andre Blais and Jean-Francois Daoust, suggesting that approximately 4% of 
voters in federal elections vote for a local candidate they prefer even though the 
candidate is running for a party other than the party they prefer: Andre Blais & Jean-
Francois Daoust, “What Do Voters Do When They Like a Local Candidate From 
Another Party?” (2017) 50:4 Can J Political Science 1103 at 1107: “In short, in these 
three provinces [BC, Ontario, and Quebec], around one voter out of ten particularly 
liked a candidate from a party other than the one he or she preferred in the 2015 
Canadian election. For two out of five of such voters, the preference for the local 
candidate trumped the party preference.”  
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consequences.”56 Fletcher’s intended change in party affiliation was also the 
opposite of the usual floor-crossing – he sought to join an opposition party, 
not the governing party.  
Moreover, what if the member leaves the party in circumstances such as 
a change in leadership or a dramatic shift in party policy? During the 2006 
debates on the prohibition, one legislator invoked the example of Winston 
Churchill and suggested that “his party deserted him.”57 Consider, at the 
federal level, the merger of the Canadian Alliance Party and the Progressive 
Conservative Party into the Conservative Party.58 One Member of 
Parliament, Joe Clark, chose to continue as a member of the Progressive 
Conservative Party.59 Another member, Scott Brison, chose to join the 
Liberal Party.60 In a sense, they abandoned the official and majority stance 
of their party by refusing to join the merged party. However, the Progressive 
Conservative party arguably deserted them both by merging with the 
Canadian Alliance party. If there had been a prohibition on floor-crossing, 
should it have affected these members? 
The prohibition might also be underinclusive. For example, if it is 
problematic for a member elected under one party to change parties, why is 
it not problematic for a member elected as an independent to join a party? 
Voters presumably took the candidate’s lack of party affiliation into account 
in a similar way as they would consider a candidate’s party affiliation. 
                                                     
56  Hansard (30 November 2017), supra note 15 at 271 (Nahanni Fontaine). See also 
MacIvor, supra note 53 at 332: “One might argue that an MP who has run afoul of the 
leader and been cast out of caucus should not be required to seek re-election for that 
reason, but there are other ways to protect dissidents.” 
57  Hansard (10 May 2006), supra note 10 at 1992 (Hon Jon Gerrard). 
58  MacIvor, supra note 53 at 331-332 describes this as one of the “peculiar consequences” 
of a floor-crossing bill I will discuss below: “Had it been in force in December 2003, 
the Bill would have required the resignation and re-election of the entire Canadian 
Alliance caucus—and those members of the Progressive Conservative caucus who did 
not become Independents—before they could take their seats as Conservatives.”  
59  See e.g. Clark Campbell “Martin’s Prize Catch”, The Globe and Mail (11 December 
2003) A1, online <theglobeandmail.com/news/national/martins-prize-
catch/article18439670/> [perma.cc/ZXX2-PUMJ]. 
60  See e.g. ibid. See also Sevi, Yoshinaka & Blais, supra note 46 at 668, citing Brison in 
support of their proposition that “not all party switching is done in the service of 
political ambition.” 
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Once the conduct to be prohibited is identified and defined, what is 
the appropriate penalty to be imposed or the deterrent to be threatened? 
The prohibition Fletcher challenged provided that the member “must sit in 
the Assembly as an independent and is to be treated as such for the purposes 
of this Act and all proceedings in the Assembly during the remainder of the 
member's term.”61 The penalty, if it can be called that,62 is “to be treated as” 
an independent. The provision functions by binding the Speaker and the 
apparatus of the Assembly. 
The provision challenged in Fletcher is similar to a prohibition enacted 
in New Brunswick in 2014 (and repealed in 2015), which provided that a 
member who: 
ceases to belong to the caucus of that registered political party during the term for 
which he or she was elected…. shall be treated during the remainder of the 
member’s term as an independent member of the Legislative Assembly with 
respect to the proceedings in the Legislative Assembly and for all other purposes.63  
(The New Brunswick prohibition also explicitly identifies resignation as an 
alternative for a member who leaves a caucus).64 However, the act adopting 
the New Brunswick prohibition, perhaps concerned about retrospective 
application of the law, also amended the Elections Act to state that “[t]he 
nomination papers of a candidate of a registered political party shall include 
a statement” acknowledging the prohibition.65 Like the Manitoba 
prohibition, the New Brunswick prohibition does not consider whether the 
member left the caucus voluntarily, and does not prevent a member elected 
                                                     
61  The Legislative Assembly Act, supra note 5, s 52.3.1. 
62  See e.g. Tardi, supra note 48 at 435, arguing that the practical effect is minimal: “the 
solution adopted by Manitoba merely prevents rival political parties from benefiting 
from the member’s intention to change allegiance. The provision recognises that 
allegiances can change over time and with altered political circumstances. While it is 
the decision of the member that disadvantages the party with which they were elected, 
such a decision cannot advantage a rival political party. However, nothing prevents 
the floor-crossing member from voting, even consistently, with a rival political party. 
The inability of the floor-crosser to actually join a rival party is a small, perhaps even 
symbolic, legislated fig-leaf of protection for the party that loses the floor-crosser.” 
63  An Act Respecting Floor Crossing, SNB 2014, c 62, s 2, adding ss 23.1(1) and (2) to the 
Legislative Assembly Act, RSNB 1973, c L-3. Removed from the Legislative Assembly Act, 
RSNB 2014, c 116, by An Act Respecting Responsible Governance, SNB 2015, c 6, s 4. 
64  Ibid, s 23.1(1). 
65  Ibid, s 1, adding s 51(4.1) to the Elections Act, RNSB 1973, c E-3. 
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as an independent from joining a caucus, or a member of a caucus leaving 
that caucus to sit as an independent. 
Contrast here Eltis’ narrower and more nuanced prohibition proposal, 
in which members who cross the floor would be prohibited from Cabinet 
membership until after a by-election or the next general election.66 This 
approach targets only the most problematic kinds of floor-crossing and does 
so in a more defensible way that is less impairing of members’ Charter 
rights.67 
The provision challenged in Fletcher and the New Brunswick 
prohibition can also be contrasted with bills from other Canadian 
jurisdictions that would have banned floor-crossing. Consider, for example, 
Bill C-212, which would have amended the Parliament of Canada Act: 
Any person holding a seat in the House of Commons who becomes a member of 
a registered party as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Canada Elections Act is 
deemed to have vacated the seat and ceases to be a member of the House if, in the 
last election, the person was endorsed by another registered party or was not 
endorsed by a registered party.68 
The penalty here is that the member actually loses his or her seat (this 
prohibition also applies to a member elected as an independent). To similar 
effect is the Ontario Respect for Voters Act, which would have amended the 
Legislative Assembly Act: 
If a member who is elected to the Assembly while a member of a political party 
registered under the Election Finances Act leaves that party or a successor of that 
party, as the case may be, the member is disqualified by law to continue to sit or 
                                                     
66  Eltis, supra note 34 at 240-243. 
67  Ibid at 240. 
68  An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (members who cross the floor), Bill C-212, 
42nd Parl, 1st Sess (2016), s 1, adding s 27.1 to the Parliament of Canada Act, RSC 
1985, c P-1. See MacIvor, supra note 53, discussing an identical bill from 38th Parl, 1st 
Sess (2006) and 38th Parl, 2d Sess (2007). MacIvor notes several shortcomings of the 
bill: its reliance on the definition of “registered party” under the Canada Elections Act, 
SC 2000, c 9, s 1 (at 330-331); the requirement that the leader of the party being 
joined to report the change in affiliation to the Speaker (at 332); and that an incentive 
(cabinet membership) for floor-crossing potentially constitutes a conflict of interest (at 
330 and 333). On the conflict of interest point, see also Turnbull, supra note 53 at 
357-363.  
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vote in the Assembly, his or her seat shall be vacated and a writ shall issue forthwith 
for a new election to fill the vacancy.69 
Under the Ontario bill, it is the act of leaving a party that triggers the 
loss of the seat. Thus, a member who is kicked out of his or her party’s 
caucus, or chooses to sit as an independent, suffers the same result as a 
member who chooses to leave his or her party’s caucus for another party’s 
caucus. In contrast, under Bill C-212, it is the act of joining a party that 
triggers the loss of the seat. Thus, a member who is kicked out of his or her 
party’s caucus retains her seat so long as she does not join another party. 
Similarly, a member can leave a party to become an independent without 
losing her seat.70 MacIvor characterizes this as one of the bill’s “peculiar 
consequences.”71 
The Ontario bill is unique in that it incorporates the idea of a “successor 
party” – although it does not attempt to define this phrase. It is unclear how 
this concept applies. In the Scott Brison situation – a member refusing to 
join a successor party and joining another party instead – the member would 
presumably lose his seat. However, the Joe Clark situation is complicated. 
By remaining in the predecessor party, Clark did not “leave” the successor 
party, he merely did not join it. 
These parameters demonstrate that a prohibition on floor-crossing, 
which may seem like a straightforward concept, becomes much more 
complex in drafting and implementation. Recall here the Minister of 
Justice’s characterization of the Manitoba prohibition as “unworkable.”72 
V. PART IV – LESSONS: THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL IN DEFENDING LEGISLATION 
Fletcher and the corresponding repeal of the floor-crossing prohibition 
also present a worthwhile case study in when a government should defend, 
                                                     
69  An Act to amend the Legislative Assembly Act to promote respect for voters, Bill 18, 40th Parl, 
1st Sess (2011), adding s 15.1 to the Legislative Assembly Act, RSO 1990, c L.10. 
70  As emphasized by Siles, supra note 23 at 178. 
71  MacIvor, supra note 53 at 331-332, esp 332: “The Bill does not explain why an MP 
who joins a new party should forfeit her seat, whereas an MP who leaves her party to 
sit as an Independent should not.”  
72  See text accompanying note 17 above.  
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or not defend, legislation in court. In particular, they raise the issue of the 
proper role of the Attorney General in defending legislation, adopted under 
a previous government, that the current government believes is bad policy 
and intends to repeal. 
Recall Fletcher’s repeated suggestion that if the government was 
repealing the prohibition because it was concerned about the cost of 
opposing his application, an easy solution would have been to concede the 
application.73 Recall the Minister of Justice’s comments in the legislative 
debates, and the government’s concession on the application, that the 
prohibition was contrary to parliamentary tradition,74 as well as the 
Minister’s statement that the prohibition was “unworkable” and “should 
never have been introduced in the first place.”75 Finally, recall also Andrew 
Swan’s assertion that the government could not concede the application 
because it had received advice that the legislation was arguably 
constitutional.76 
Since it is impossible to know what advice the government received, it 
is best to set out two possibilities. In scenario one, the government thinks 
the prohibition is bad policy but has received advice that it is arguably 
constitutional. In scenario two, the government thinks the prohibition is 
bad policy and has received advice that it is not constitutional. Is conceding 
the application appropriate in either scenario? Arguably, only in scenario 
two. 
The literature in this area is divided over whether the Attorney General, 
acting on behalf of the government, can properly concede the 
unconstitutionality of legislation. Grant Huscroft (now Justice Huscroft of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal) has argued that “a decision by an Attorney 
General to concede that legislation is unconstitutional is constitutionally 
objectionable because it undermines the legislative branch of 
government.”77 That is, there is a “constitutional interest inherent in 
                                                     
73  See text accompanying note 18 above. 
74  See text accompanying notes 15 and 32 above. 
75  See text accompanying note 17 above. 
76  See text accompanying note 19 above. 
77  Grant Huscroft, “The Attorney General and Charter Challenges to Legislation: 
Advocate or Adjudicator?” (1995) 5 NJCL 125 at 158-159 [Huscroft, “Advocate or 
Adjudicator”]. 
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defence of the legislative process” and “the defence of legislation is 
constitutionally important for its own sake.”78 Indeed, under this view, the 
Attorney General has a “constitutional duty to the legislative branch.”79 
Moreover, such concessions establish bad precedents and impede the 
proper role of the courts to determine constitutionality.80 Under Huscroft’s 
view, the Attorney General should essentially never concede the 
unconstitutionality of a law. It is for the Attorney General to protect the 
lawmaking power of the legislature, and it is for the courts to determine 
constitutionality. 
In contrast, former Attorney General for Ontario Ian Scott argued that 
concessions are appropriate where the Attorney General considers the 
legislation to be unconstitutional: 
I think it is reasonable to conclude that an attorney general, if he advises the 
government that the provincial law is unconstitutional, is free to indicate, with 
Cabinet concurrence, that he will amend the legislation in the face of a challenge 
or settle the lawsuit on the basis that the law is unconstitutional.81 
Scott himself directed government lawyers to concede unconstitutionality 
in some circumstances.82 Similarly, Kent Roach argues that “[t]he Attorney 
General should not impose burdens on citizens by defending laws that are 
                                                     
78  Ibid at 154. See also Grant Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty and Discretion: The Attorney 
General in the Charter Era” (2009) 34:2 Queen’s LJ 773 at 800-805, esp 804 (“the 
Attorney General should not be able to undermine the constitutional validity of 
legislation by refusing to defend it”) and 804-805 (“The obligation to defend 
legislation that is subject to Charter challenge requires the Attorney General to put 
duty to the law, and to the legislature more broadly, ahead of the government’s 
interests and thus serves as an important check on executive power.”) [Huscroft, 
“Duty”].  
79  Huscroft, “Advocate or Adjudicator”, supra note 77 at 143. 
80  Ibid at 158-161. See also Huscroft, “Duty”, supra note 78 at 803: “An Attorney 
General who concedes that legislation violates the Charter purports to determine the 
entire question before the Court.” 
81  The Honourable Ian Scott, “Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General: 
Constancy and Change in the 1980s” (1989) 39:2 UTLJ 109 at 124. Scott’s position 
on federal legislation was more complex and is unnecessary to consider here for my 
purposes. 
82  See e.g. ibid at 124-125, describing two cases in which the government of Ontario 
conceded unconstitutionality. 
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clearly unconstitutional or conducting litigation in a manner that ignores 
clear constitutional obligations placed upon the state.”83 
A mixed or more nuanced view would be that the government should 
defend legislation whenever there is a credible argument for its 
constitutionality.84 While a credible argument is difficult to define, Noël J 
in Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General) described a credible argument as “[a]n 
argument that is credible, bona fide, and capable of being successfully argued 
before the courts.”85 Under this view, it is the existence of a credible 
argument for constitutionality, not the government’s opinion that the 
legislation is constitutional or unconstitutional, that is determinative. It is 
this approach to which Andrew Swan referred in the legislative debates on 
the repeal of the prohibition.86 This approach protects the lawmaking ability 
of the legislature to a reasonable but not absolute extent – the freedom to 
pass laws that are at least arguably constitutional. 
However, none of these approaches indicate what a government should 
do when it believes legislation to be constitutional but bad policy. I would 
argue that the decision to defend against a constitutional challenge should 
be made regardless of the government’s view as to whether or not the law is 
problematic as policy. Under the Huscroft view, unconstitutionality should 
never be conceded; under the Scott view, concession is appropriate where 
the government believes the legislation is unconstitutional; under the mixed 
view, concession is inappropriate so long as there is a credible argument as 
to constitutionality. However, under no view is it appropriate to concede 
unconstitutionality merely because the government believes the legislation 
is bad policy, even if it plans to repeal the law for that reason. The 
government is free to concede in court that the law is bad policy, as the 
government of Manitoba did in Fletcher by conceding that the prohibition 
                                                     
83  Kent Roach, “Not Just the Government’s Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender 
of the Rule of Law” (2006) 31:2 Queen’s LJ 598 at 610. 
84  See Huscroft, “Advocate or Adjudicator”, supra note 77 at 161, n 94, citing Patrick J 
Monahan & Marie Finkelstein, “The Charter of Rights and Public Policy in Canada” 
(1992) 30 Osgoode Hall LJ 501 at 526: “The Saskatchewan Attorney General … will 
defend legislation if it is arguably constitutional.” 
85  Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 269 at para 5, aff’d 2018 FCA 55. There 
are problems with the “credible argument” standard, but they are beyond the scope of 
this comment. 
86  See text accompanying note 19 above. 
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was contrary to parliamentary traditions, and indicate its plan to repeal the 
law, as the government also did in Fletcher.87 But neither this concession nor 
this indication have legal consequences.88 
The lesson, or reminder, from Fletcher is that, while the government 
should perhaps be willing to concede the unconstitutionality of legislation 
that it has been advised is unconstitutional, it should never concede 
unconstitutionality merely to expedite the nullification of a law that it 
considers to be bad policy. That is, the correct approach to legislation that 
is merely bad policy is to amend or repeal it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this comment, I have provided an overview of Fletcher and explained 
its important lessons for lawmaking and the legal defence of government 
legislation. In Part I, I provided the context of the passage and repeal of the 
prohibition on floor-crossing challenged in Fletcher. In Part II, I set out the 
arguments made and reasons given in Fletcher, and provided a brief critique 
of those reasons. Then in Part III I demonstrated that Fletcher provides a 
case study in the translation of ideas into legislation, a process that can be 
more difficult than it appears. In particular, defining the conduct that is to 
be prohibited can often result in underinclusive or overinclusive laws, and 
determining the appropriate sanction can be difficult. Finally, in Part IV, I 
considered the lessons from Fletcher in whether the Attorney General 
should concede the unconstitutionality of a law that the government 
considers bad policy and plans to repeal. I argued that while the government 
should perhaps be willing to concede the unconstitutionality of legislation 
that it has been advised is unconstitutional, it should never concede 
unconstitutionality merely to expedite the nullification of a law that it 
considers to be bad policy. 
Fletcher ultimately demonstrates that governments should defend 
constitutionally viable laws in court – even laws that were adopted by a 
previous government and that are destined for repeal as bad policy. This 
                                                     
87  Fletcher, supra note 2 at para 47. 
88  As I discussed above, the fact that the legislature has already repealed the challenged 
provision does raise issues of mootness. See text accompanying note 44 above. Also, if 
being contrary to parliamentary tradition makes the prohibition suspect under the 
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, then this concession does have legal 
consequences. See text accompanying note 47 above. 
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defence is not a waste of public funds, even if it may appear so at some level. 
Furthermore, it is not for the courts to strike down laws that are bad policy 
but constitutional. The sole appropriate response to such bad laws is 
amendment or repeal by the legislature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
